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ABSTRACT 
One of the most urgent challenges of today 1s the decay of natural life resources. Although, the last 35 years saw the 
creating of numerous environmental agreements, environmental conditions have not improved as these treaties suggest One 
of the main reasons for this situation is the lack of proper enforcement of international environmental law. The pitfalls of 
enforcement of international environmental law are mainly due to the lack of financial private interest in environmental law 
In recent years. the gap in the representation of environmental interests has been filled by NGOs. They have been more and 
more able to safeguard the interests of the environment. NGOs have chosen ways to safe the environment by partic1patmg m 
law-making and monitoring. This role has been acknowledged and valued by both international organisations and nauonal 
governments. However, they are not able to enforce environmental agreements, because they mostly lack legal standmg 
before international and domestic couns. Existing momtonng bodies are insufficient due to lack of financial resources and the 
fragmentation of international environmental law. Although, NGOs filled this gap and have great influence in law-making 
and monitoring. they do not have access to justice before international fora. However, this access to justice is a viable mean 
in enforcing international environmental law because environmental decision often remain unchallenged. This fact 1s based 
on the state-focused lit1gat1on scheme at the internauonal level and the need to be individually concerned at the domestic 
level. Environmental decisions often do not affect individual rights, due to the nature of the environment as a res commurus. 
Therefore. someone has to have a voice for the environment. NGOs are well-equipped to fill this gap. The main reason is that 
NGOs are not restricted by international politics and that they have the vital information from their panicipation in law 
making and monitoring. The decay of natural resources is a global environmental phenomena and supra-national in scope. 
Therefore. it exceed the capacity of individual states. 
In recent years, panicipatory rights developed a great deal. Mainly the Aarhus Convention contnbuted to an 
enhancement of environmental democracy. It grants citizens and their organisations the right to environmental inforn1at1on 
and access to justice in environmental matters. This convention is on its way to be well-implemented in Europe. It 1s lughly 
desirable, that this regional development will be transferred to the international level in tl1e future. 
Word length 
The text of this paper (exc luding abstract, table of contents, foo tnotes and 
bibliography) compromises approximately 12.300 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
"Man is endowed with reason and creative powers to increase and 
multiply his inheritance, yet up to now he has created nothing, only 
destroyed. The forests grow ever fewer; the rivers parch; the wild life is 
gone; the climate is ruined; and with every passing day the earth 
becomes uglier and poorer." 1 
One of the most urgent challenges of today is the decay of natural life 
resources. Examples range from global climate change via biodiversity depletion, 
to site contamination, acid rain, air pollution and oil contaminated coasts. To fight 
these environmental problems, international environmental law provides the 
appropriate legal instruments . 
Environmental law is a relatively new field of international law.2 As countries 
industrialised environmental pollution environmental issues has became more 
prevalent. Despite a number of specific decisions and treaties the field of 
international environmental law did not really take off until the 1960s due to 
specific research on the different impacts of industri a li sation such as air pollution 
and acid rain, for example. In general, the environmental field has developed in an 
ad hoe manner in response to specific environmental harm. Environmental Liability 
is one of the main example for this development. The last 35 years saw the creating 
of numerous environmental agreements. Environmental law has become "one of the 
most dynamic areas of the international legal system".3 Although all these treaties 
reflect a growing global environmental awareness, environmental conditions have 
not improved as these treaties suggest. One of the main reasons for this situation is 
the lack of proper enforcement of international environmental law. "Enforcement" 
is defined as " the compelling of obedience" to law. 4 Nevertheless, we should have 
1 Anton Chekhov, Uncle Yanya, act I (circa 1896). 
2 David Hunter, James Salzmann, Durwood Zaelke (ed's) International Environmental Law and Policy 
(2nd ed, Foundation Press, New York, 2002), 280. 
3 Je ffrey L. Dunoff From Green To Global 19 ( 1995) Harv.Envtl.L.Rev. 241, 241. 
4 Blacks Law Dictionary 549 (7th ed.1999). 
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in mind that international environmental law is not completely disobeyed, although, 
some of the well-intentioned environmental agreements remain unenforced.5 
The pitfalls of enforcement of international environmental law are mainly 
due to the lack of financial private interest in environmental law. On the contrary, 
this lack is not found in other areas of law like trade law for example, which is 
concerned with economic matters. The only area of environmental law in which 
economical interest are tackled is environmental liability. Therefore, the paper will 
analyse environmental liability provisions in more depth, on the European level. 
The absence of economical interest creates further obstacles, like the 
insufficiency of existing monitoring bodies, mainly the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP). These bodies mostly cannot work properly 
because of their short financial funds. In today's capitalist world, states are mainly 
concerned with their economies and as a lot of environmental regulations seems to 
hinder industrial interest, on which states are relying, environmental interests fall 
short. This explains why states seem to have little interest in monitoring and 
enforcing environmental law properly. 
In recent years, the gap in the representation of environmental interests has 
been filled by NGOs. They have been more and more able to safeguard the interests 
of the environment. NGOs have chosen ways to safe the environment by 
participating in law-making and monitoring. The role of NGOs in monitoring the 
implementation of international treaties has been acknowledged and valued by both 
international organisations and national governments. 6 However, they are not able 
to enforce environmental agreements, because they mostly lack legal standing 
before international and domestic courts. Their increased asset should lead to a 
greater role in enforcing environmental law. 
This insufficiency of monitoring bodies goes hand in hand with the lack of 
access to justice on the international level, because without proper monitoring of 
environmental matters nobody would know what the actual state of the 
5 Andrew Watson Samaan £11force111ent Of International Environmental Treaties: An Analysis (]993) 5 
Fordham Envtl. L.J .261 , 273. 
6 Chiara Giorgetti The Role Of No11govem111ental Organi-::.ations In The Climate Change Negotiations 
(1998) Col. J. lnt'I Ent!. L & Pol'y,115. 
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environment is. However, the need for environmental information is a precondition 
to enforcing environmental law. Since NGOs play an increasing role in law-making 
and monitoring they should also play a bigger role in enforcement. The same 
problem of lacking private financial interests is partly hindering the proper 
enforcement of environmental law. If no private financial interests are concerned, 
no individual right is affected. However, in most systems only the individual 
concern justifies to challenge an environmental decision. This criteria of individual 
concern is not only due to financial interest but takes also basic rights such as 
health and life into account. 
Though, the problem which occurs in environmental law is that theses basic 
needs are relatively seldom tackled by environmental decisions, at least in 
developed countries. Therefore, it is highly likely that nobody will chal lenge 
environmental decisions, only because nobody is individually concerned. On the 
other hand, this lack of plaintiffs does not mean that an environmental decision is 
not worth challenging to safeguard environmental interests. The uneforcing of 
provisions and plans harming the environment is due to a lack of environmental 
democracy. 
NGOs are perfect to enforce environmental provisions because there is a high 
likelihood that they worked on their making and monitoring. In addition, they do 
not have to take political and economical issues into consideration as states have to. 
NGOs could give the environment the voice that it needs so much. 
This paper will examine the rise of NGOs and their legal status at the 
international level, especially in the European law system. It will analyse the 
effectiveness of existing monitoring bodies, the existing access to justice and the 
proposals that have been made to enhance these areas. 
A milestone in environmental democracy on the international level is the 
Aarhus Convention. 7 Although regional in scope it influenced the development of 
environmental democracy in an important way. Therefore, it will be examined 
closely. 
7 UN/ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters, that was adopted and signed, also by the Community, at the fourth 
mini sterial conference in Arhus (Denmark) , 23-25 June 1998. ln the following "Aarhus Convention". 
8 
The regional European regime of participatory rights will be examined 
afterwards, because it has been greatly influenced by the Aarhus Convention. As 
environmental liability is the main point at which economical interests are tackled 
in the same way as environmental matters, a recently proposed Directive of the 
Commission concerning environmental liability will be considered. It is a good 
example to illustrate these competing interests, and will serve as an example of the 
development of participatory rights in Europe. A further step of environmental 
democracy has been taken by a very recent proposal for a Directive on access to 
justice in environmental matters. 
As Margot Wallstrom, European Commissioner for the Environment pointed 
out: 
"Empowering people to protect their environment is a cornerstone of effective policymaking. 
Citizens must be given the right to know how good or bad the state of the environment is and to 
participate in decision-making that will affect their health and quality of life. A well-informed and 
active public means more effective environmental legislation and better enforcement policies. 
Citizens will now be able as environmental watchdogs."8 
The paper will emphasise that the European regime of participatory rights is on 
its way to more environmental democracy. The paper will promote the thesis that 
the only viable way to safeguard environmental interests is to give NGOs access to 
justice. Without enhancing environmental democracy enforcement of 
environmental law will not be improved. In Europe NGOs gam more access to 
justice on the domestic level. However, this is only the beginning and it is 
foreseeable that these developments will be influence the European dimension of 
access to justice. Therefore, it is only a question of time until these developments 
will be further transferred to the international level. 
8 >http://www.participate.org/documents/EC-press-release-aarhus-25- l 0-03.pdf< (last accessed on l 0 
December 2003). 
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/I RISE OF NGOs 
A History and evolution of NGO's 
In today's world of international environmental law NGOs have gained an 
increased role in law-making and monitoring. In the last decades, NGOs are 
playing an increasingly significant role in the development of international law, by 
influencing the drafting of international treaties for example. The legal consequence 
of the rise of NGOs is an increase in their participatory rights. These participatory 
rights must be strengthened in order to secure their gained position in international 
decision making and monitoring. The need for a legal standing of organisations is 
based on the rise of environmental NGOs in recent years. 
Non-state actors are more influential than ever before, and there are numerous 
NGO's . The fact that the number of participating NGOs at the Rio Earth Summit 
exceeded the number of states speaks to the growing number of importance of 
them. 9 Environmental NGOs play a role in the "establishment and enforcement of 
environmental priorities." 10 However, they are not a new phenomenon. Their 
existence on the international arena can be dated back almost centuries ago, 
depending on the view point. 11 Nevertheless, the recent involvement of NGOs in 
the international realm intensified in the 1970s and 1980s, when these entities 
began to grow in number, size, and diversity. 12 The interest in the environment has 
9 Rudiger Wolfrum, Nele Matz in Rudiger Wolfrum, Arm.in von Bogdany (ed ' s) Conflicts in 
lmema1ional E11viro11111e11tal Law, Springer Berlin 2003, 204. 
10 A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Gol'em111en1 Organi::.mions in the Development of International 
£11l'iro11111ental Law, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev .( 1992), 62. 
11 Some authors regard the Christian churches and their spiritual and secular orders in the 6
th century 
A.O. as the first kind of NGOs. The most authors, however, regard private organisations in the 18
th 
century as the first predecessors of today's NGOs. The Covenant of the League of ations of 19 l 9 
established no formal rules governing the relationship between the League of Nations and NGOs. Rather, 
it referred in Article 25 only to the national organisations of the Red Cross. In 1921 the first attempt to 
recognise NGOs legal status was made by the the League Council with respect to Article 24, which 
addressed the relationship with other international organisations, a wide interpretation in order to 
incorporate GOs in this Article. However, this idea has been abolished only two years later. 
12 Steve Chamovitz Two Cenwries Of Par1icipation: NGOs And International Governance ( 1997) 18 
Mich. J. lnt'l L. 261,544. 
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increased substantially since the 1980s, which has led to the rise of environmental 
NGOs (ENGOs). 
B Reasons for growing NGO participation 
There are vanous reasons for the increased influence of NGOs at the 
international level. The most important one is the process of globalisation. 
Globalisation is commonly defined as the "denationalisation of clusters of political , 
economic, and social activities" 13 that undermine the ability of the sovereign State 
to control activities on its territory, due to the growing need to find solutions for 
global problems, like the pollution of the environment, on an international level. 
Other reasons are the faster telecommunications systems and world wide media 
companies. The creation of international environmental law is a result of a 
increased general awareness for the protection of the environment. Moreover, in all 
the main international conferences in recent years, like the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (UNCED) 14, one 
can observe increasing NGO participation. 15 The UNCED established a new style 
of operations for NGOs in relation to their governments. Citizen participation in 
policy making was enhanced by public meetings , increased lobbying, and the 
submission of alternative plans. NGOs are able to fill the niche in international law 
which is created by the state-centered notion of international law because of three 
advantages that they have over nation states. 16 First, they can "articulate powerful 
universal , single-purpose standards," because they do not have to trade off for other 
objectives. Second, they have "little incentive to subordinate science to other 
political or economical considerations." Finally, they can often cooperate with local 
13 Jost DelbrUck Globalization Of Law, Politics And Markets- Implications For Domestic Law-A 
European Perspective ( 1993) I Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 9, I I. 
14 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biodiversity, opened 
for signature June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 822 (hereinafter UNCED). 
15 Patricia Waak Shaping A Sustainable Planet: The Role Of Non- Governmental Organizations 
(1995) 6 Colo. J. lnt'L Envtl. L. & Pol'Y 345, 346. 
16 Chiara Giorgetti The Role Of Nongovem111ental Organi=:.atio11s /11 The Climate Change Negotiations 
(1998) Col. J . lnt'l Ent!. L& Pol'y, 120. 
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environmental groups. 17 NGOs directly participate m the enforcement of 
international environmental standards by lobbying, monitoring, and denouncing 
states' behaviour and by allocating resources. 18 
NGOs' influence is built on a niche that other international actors are ill-
equipped to fill. Because NGOs are gaining a more and more important role and 
influence in international decision-making process, there is also a growing need for 
recognising their internationally legal standards. 
Another point of view is given by Karsten Nowrot, who points out that legal 
status for NGOs arises from the character of international law itself. 19 He argues 
that because of the increasingly important and influential role in the area of 
international realm, regarding international law as a system with the objective of 
ensuring legal certainty and international peace.20 Whether the need for access to 
justice is based on this rather theoretical view or on the assessment of today's 
reality of making and enforcement of international environmental law does not 
concern the outcome: the need for an increased environmental democracy. Without 
sufficient enforcement methods the law itself is useless. 
Existing legal fora are inadequate in respect to international environmental 
disputes and NGOs have proved their ability to fill this role in international 
environmental law in recent decades. 
17 A. Dan Tarlock, The Role Of Non-Government Organi::.ations In The Development Of International 
Environmenwl Law ( 1992) 68 Chi.-Kenl L. Rev., 65. 
18 A. Dan Tarlock, The Role Of Non-Government Organizations In The Development Of International 
Environmental Law ( 1992) 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev., 75. 
19 Karsten owrot Legal Consequences Of Globalization: The Status Of Non -Governmental 
Organizations Under lmemational Law 6 Ind. J . Global Legal Stud. 601. 
2° Karsten Nowrol Legal Consequences Of Globalization: The Status Of Non-Governmental 
Organizations Under International Law 6 Ind. J . Global Legal Stud. 601. 
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C Why NGOs should have a standing 
Most important are three arguments that support a need for a standing of 
NGOs before international courts and fora. The first one is that all global 
environmental phenomena are supra-national in scope and therefore, exceed the 
capacity of indi victual states. The second one is based on the rise of NGOs in recent 
decades. This increase in participation must lead to an increase in their access to 
justice. NGOs do participate in today 's treaty making as never before, nevertheless 
they do not have the same status of participation in monitoring their enforcement. 
Some regard NGOs as the most cost effective enforcement available to the 
international community.21 Steve Chamovitz states that "enforcement by private 
entities such as international environmental organisations can be more persuasive 
than the more conventional governmental approach."22 The main reason he 
concludes is that NGOs are not restricted by international politics. A lot of NGOs 
have the advantage of being independently funded . Therefore, they can focus 
limited financial resources on special issues. They are not influenced by lobbying 
of the industry which is a great factor for a states government in terms of 
economical growth. This advantage is described as "politically independence" .23 As 
Saaman notes that "[i]nternational agencies are neither shackled by international 
politics or influenced by political pressures, since, for the most part, they are 
generally privately funded" .2• Consequently, NGOs could make use of a number of 
enforcement techniques, for example organising boycotts; bringing complaints to 
international authorities. 
NGOs uses the fact that public officials are particularly sensitive to publicity. 
Because of their ability to mobilise public support, NGOs are often essential to the 
21 
Steve Charnovitz Two Centuries Of Participation: NGOs and International Governance ( I 997) I 8 
Mich. J . lnt'l L. 274. 
22 
Steve Charnovitz Two Centuries Of Participation: NGOs and International Governance ( 1997) I 8 
Mich. J. lnt'l L. 274. 
23 
Steve Charnovitz Two Centuries Of Participation: NGOs and International Governance (1997) 18 
Mich. J. lnt'l L. 274/275. 
24 
Andrew Watson Samaan Enforcement of International Environmental Treaties : An Analysis ( 1993) 5 
Fordham Envtl. L.J. 261,274. 
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creation and functioning of international environmental regimes. 25 Another notable 
case in connection with the role of NGOs in judicial proceedings is the arbitration 
between France and Greenpeace following the destruction of the Rainbow Warrior 
by French government agents in a New Zealand port in 1985. It was the first time 
that an international damages case was arbitrated by agreement between a State and 
an international NGO. 
Finally , the third argument for a standing of NGOs is that the environment is 
a res communis. Consequently, the protection of the environment is naturally more 
often a public interest rather than an individual concern. Nevertheless, many legal 
systems only allow challenging of environmental decisions when one is 
individually concerned. Hence, many decisions that harm the environment remain 
unchallenged and the law remains unenforced. It is the most important task of 
NGOs to raise a voice for the environment. They are only able to fill this gap if 
they wi 11 get enhanced access to justice. 
C NGOs and international law 
1 recent acknowledgement at the international level 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 1992, is 
often cited as a catalyst with respect to NGOs participation. At this conference 
NGO networking and financial support enabled 1400 NGOs to attend the 
conference as UN-recognised participants. 26 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
to which was added the Kyoto Protocol 21 established a precedent for the 
involvement of NGOs in negotiations of international treaties and Articles 4(l)(i), 
25 Andrew Watson Samaan Enforcement Of International Environmental Treaties: An Analysis ( 1993) 5 
Fordham Envtl. L.J. 261, 274; For instance, NGOs were instrumental in initiating the first truly world 
wide campaign to slop the slaughter of whales by using graphic videos. 
26 Michael Mason Enviro11111e11tal Democracy (Earthscan Publications Ltd, London, 1999) 217. 
27 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec . 10, 1997, 
Conference of the Parties, 3d Sess, Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/Add. l. 
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7(2)(1) and 7(6) of the Convention address the role that NGOs were to play in the 
international climate change negotiations. Article 7(6) established the rule for 
admission to negotiating proceedings, stating: 
"Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-
governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has 
informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the 
Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one-third of the Parties present 
object." 
This essentially allowed ENGOs access to all negotiations following the 
Convention and leading up to the signing of the Kyoto Protocol. 
2 NGOs as subject of international law ? 
Formal consultative status for international NGOs has been available since 
1968 through accreditation by the UN Economic and Social Council, but this 
mechanism has not been widely employed until recently. UN consultative status is 
accorded to those NGOs of " international standing" who are representative of 
relevant fields of competence and are democratically constituted. 28 
Rudiger Wolfrum emphasis the view that " the fact that NGOs are not, m 
general, subjects of international law, is not the decisive factor with respect to the 
role they play in coordinating international environmental law ."29 Although this is 
debatable, he highlights the need for placing NGOs on equal footing with 
international organisations in order to clarify the status of NGOs in public 
international law. 30 The author of this paper strongly agrees with that view. 
While it is possible to grant the status and rights of a subjects of international 
law to a NGO it has been limited so far to the status of the Committee of the 
International Red Cross. For the last years, despite the increased size, numbers and 
involvement of NGOs there has not been any significant trend toward formalising 
28 Michael Mason Environmental Democracy (Earthscan Publications Ltd, London, 1999) 218. 
29 Rudiger Wolfrum, ele Matz in Rudiger Wolfrum, Armin von Bogdany (ed's) Conflicts in 
lntematio11al Enviro11111e11tal Law (Springer, Berlin 2003) 206. 
'
0 Rudiger Wolfrum, ele Matz in Rudiger Wolfrum, Armin von Bogda ny (ed's) Conflicts 1n 
!tuemmional Environmental Law (Springer, Berlin 2003) 206. 
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the public law nature of NGOs. If this right is withhold from them they must have 
at least the right to litigate cases before domestic and -in the future- before 
international courts. 
C Short survey of the development of the European environmental policy 
The development of the European environmental policy began in the 1970s. 
During the ratification of the treaty of Rome 1956/1957 the signatories did not 
realise the dimension of transboundary environmental matters. The first 
environmental action programme was released in 1973. This programme focused 
on industry, energy, agriculture, transportation and tourism. In the following years 
the biggest part of environmental law of the Member States has been released on 
the European level, while Member States implement these measures. Beside the 
founding of the European Environmental Agency (EEA) and the EU etwork for 
the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL) the 
environmental policy had still a low status in European policy. The basis for 
European environmental law is the European File (EEA) of 1987, because after its 
release the objective of an European Single Market was combined with 
environmental protection31 and environmental policy was noticed as an individual 
field of policy. 32 The Objectives of European environmental policy are stated in 
Article 174 p. l EC Treaty .33 The Treaty of Maastricht of 07 February 1997, till 
then the biggest amendment of the EC Treaty, has not stated any essential 
amendments for the environmental policy. 34 This chanced for the first time, with the 
31 Article 95 p. 3 EC Treaty. 
32 Article 174- 176 EC Treaty. 
33 I. Community policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following objectives: -
preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, protecting human health , -
prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources, - promoting measures at international level 
to deal with regional or world wide environmental problems. 2. Community policy on the 
environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations 
in the various regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on 
the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be 
rectified at source and that the polluter should pay. 
34 Florian T. Furtak Nicluregiem11gsorga11isatio11e11 (NCOs) i111 polirische11 System der Europaischen 
U11io11 - Strukt11ren und Bereilig1111gs111oglichkeite11 (tuduv - Verlags-GmbH, MUnchen, 2001) 128. 
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Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, which implemented environmental 
protection into Article 2 of the EC Treaty. Further, newly implemented has been an 
Article 6 which stipulates that environmental matters must be considered in all 
European policies. 
17 
Ill INSUFFICIENCY OF EXISTING MONITORING BODIES 
A Fragmentation of environmental law 
Existing monitoring bodies often are hindered by the fragmentation of 
international environmental law. After a treaty is negotiated, adopted and ratified it 
must be implemented and monitored for compliance. 35 However, one of the general 
problems of enforcing international environmental law is the process of monitoring 
existing treaties. This task could be either fulfilled by a monitoring body or by 
NGOs. 
Categories of international law are treaties , general principles of law and 
customary international law. 36 Treaties are a traditional source of law. Their 
primary function is to create specific legal obligations between parties from 
expressed consent of States. They can also contribute to the development of 
customary international law. Article 2. 1 (a) of the Vienna Convention defines 
treaty as "an international agreement concluded between States in written from and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two 
or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation". The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties is widely accepted as part of customary 
international law. It is even widely accepted among non-parties.37 Partly, this 
Convention expresses the traditional view of intemaLional law that non-state actors 
can be neither subjects nor authors of international law. Therefore, another 
Convention was ratified dealing with this problem: the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between 
International Organisations. 38 
35 Ratification is defined in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties. 
36 Article 38 ( l) of the International Court of Justice Statutes. 
37 For example, the USA never ratified the Vienna Convention. Nevertheless, the US Dept. of State has 
dec lared that the principles are binding upon the US. (page 206) 
38 25 I. L. M. 543 21 March I 986. 
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One of the obstacles to enforce all these treaties is due to the fact that we have 
an overwhelming number of environmental treaties that have been composed since 
1972.39 The term " treaty congestion" has been "stamped" by Professor Edith Brown 
Weiss. The statement of Professor Brown Weiss that a plurality of treaties might 
lead to overlapping provisions has been relativised by the argument rising from the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. However, as many modem treaties 
establish their own institutions, the lack of co-ordination between them continues. 
A fragmentation of the environmental system occurs, because the main institutions 
operate independently of each other. Not only does the problem of splintered 
centrality arise, but they also do house their central offices in different countries 
and far away from their various joint projects and operations. 
Although , the various secretariats, monitoring processes and dispute 
resolution procedures have different responsibilities, they have still the same 
purpose to protect the global environment. The obstacle that there are numerous 
institutions 1s linked to another issue. Further obstacles for effective 
implementation/enforcement are sufficient political, administrative and economic 
capacity. Many of the institutions have calls on the administrative sector of states. 
This leads to the fact, as Professor Brown Weiss points out, that even industrialised 
states with well-developed regulatory mechanisms and bureaucracies show signs of 
being overwhelmed. 40 Due to the fragmentation of international environmental law 
no sufficient monitoring body exist so far. In addition, the lack of economical 
interests in international environmental law aggravates the monitoring. To illustrate 
this problem the paper will tum to analyse the United Nations Environmental 
Programme more closely . 
39 Edith Brown Weiss International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues And The Emergence Of A 
New World Order ( 1993) 81 Geo L. J. 697 /698. 
40 Edith Brown Weiss Imemationa/ £11viro11111emal Law: Comemporary Issues And The Emergence Of A 
New World Order (I 993) 81 Geo L. J. 702. 
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B UNEP 
The Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm41 , Sweden, held by the 
United Nations in 1972 was a major turning point in international environmental 
law.42 The Stockholm Conference is widely recognised as the "cocoon from which 
the chrysalis of international environmental law emerged as a legal subject in its 
own rights."43 The Conference had three major results: an action plan to protect the 
global environment, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and 
related funds and the Stockholm Declaration. 
The United ations Environmental Programme (UNEP) is a subsidiary organ 
of the United Nations that was created by UNGA Resolution 2997 (XXVII) after 
the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. The political 
organs of the U have recognised international legal personalities, i.e. are deemed 
to be subjects of international law. The United Nations Environmental Programme 
played major role in developing treaties and other international legal instruments. 
At the time of its creation in 1972, UNEP was the exclusive multilateral agency 
concerned with the environment. Its particular role within the United Nations 
system was seen to identify emerging environmental problems and help to shape an 
international solutions. In the following decades, the exclusive role of UNEP was 
progressively undermined because many other United Nations agencies started to 
involve themselves in the environmental field. 44 
UNEP is based on a decision by the Stockholm UN Environment Conference 
of June 1972.45 However, it was not created as a UN specialised Agency, but as an 
41 Doc. N8730 ( 1972). 
42 However, a series of principles which turned into hard law emerged from thi s Convention, such as the 
principles I - 5 which recognised collective responsibility to future generations and create the general 
obligation to conserve natural resources. 
43 Lakshaman D. Guruswamy, /111ematio11al E11viro11111e11tal Law: Boundaries, Landmarks, And Rea/ties 
(1995) JO Nat. Resources & Env ' t. 43. 
44 Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the review of the United Nations Environment 
Programme and the administrative practices of its secretariats, including the United Nations Office in 
Nairobi (N5 I/8 l 0) , available via: >http://www .un.org/Depts/oios/reports/a5 l 8 l 0/51-8 IOe.htm< (last 
accessed on I O December 2003). 
45 General Assembly resolution 2997 (XXVll) (Institutional and financial arrangements for international 
environmental cooperation) of 15 December I 972, available via: 
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institution subordinate to the General Assembly. Therefore it has no power to 
participate in international law and cannot be a party of an international treaty. 
According to the Resolution 2997 (XXVII) , UNEP is structured in three main 
organs. These are the Governing Council, a Secretariat, and the Environment Fund. 
The Governing Council consists of 58 State Representatives, chosen every four 
years from the General Assembly . It is the main body of UNEP and comes together 
every two years. Its mam functions and responsibilities are held in the General 
Assembly resolution 2997 (XXVII), for example, the promotion of international 
cooperation in the field of the environment, providing general policy guidance for 
environmental programs within the United Nations and to keep under review the 
world environmental situation.46 
Agenda 21 has assigned UNEP with a greater role in lawmaking as before, 
recognising its contribution to international environmental relations.47 The tasks 
that were assigned by Resolution 2997 (XXVII) and Agenda 21 establish UNEP as 
the principal institution for steering and guidance in international environmental 
law.48 However, "Agenda 21 does not specify which measures UNEP can, or 
should, adopt in making use of its competence regarding the coordination of 
agreements. Neither can Agenda 21, as a political non-binding declaration, grant a 
legal mandate to UNEP or widen its competences in this respect."49 Therefore, 
UNEP's chance to be transformed into a UN Specialised Agency is far from 
realisation. UNEP has played a leading role in the promotion of regional 
conventions aimed at, e.g., protecting the seas against pollution. UNEP has evolved 
into a standing structure for negotiating draft resolutions sent, after their evaluation, 
to the General Assembly. '0 Despite the ambitious layout of UNEP serious problems 
lead to the insufficiency of the body. 
<http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTIO /GEN/ R0/270/27/IMG/NR027027.pdf?OpenElement> 
(last accessed on 19.06.2003). 
46 <http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?Document1D=43&Article1D=2623> (last accessed on 
20.06.2003). 
47 Agenda 21, Chap. 38.21 , 38.22a. 
48 Rudiger Wolfrum, Nele Matz in Riidiger Wolfrum, Arm.in von Bogdany (ed's) Conflicts in 
International Enviro11111e111al Law (Springer, Berlin, 2003) 181. 
49 Riidiger Wolfrum, Nele Matz in Riidiger Wolfrum, Arm.in von Bogdany (ed's) Conflicts in 
/ntemational Environmental Law (Springer, Berlin, 2003) I 82. 
50 David Hunter, James Salzmann, Durwood Zaelke (ed's) /111emationa/ E11viro11memal Law and Policy 
(2nd ed, Foundation Press, New York, 2002), 250. 
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The key problem UNEP is facing is that its role following the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development needs clarification. Pursuant to a 
report of Internal Oversight reviewing UNEP it is not clear to staff or to 
stakeholders what that role should be.51 Due to this unclearness the funds of UNEP 
are still a lot smaller than the fund of the biggest NGO in the US; and they are still 
declining. 
Most UNEP activities are financed through voluntary contributions, most of 
which come from a small number of donors. In addition there is a modest 
contribution from the regular budget of the United Nations, but the bulk of UNEP 
activities are funded from the Environment Fund or from trust funds , of which 
UNEP has more than 50. Confronted with declining resources, managers of the 
UNEP have not yet made all of the necessary hard choices.52 Since they have had 
fewer resources with which to operate. Most of the UNEP's staff time and energy 
has been spent in paring down programmes, resulting in less time to think or to do 
environmental work. Therefore visible environmental results were reduced also. 
However, this lead to reduced donor confidence and lower contributions. However, 
in reaction to the current deepening lack of resources further programme reductions 
occurred. 
These problems have been worsened by the limited ability of the newly 
established United Nations Office at Nairobi. UNEP is headquartered in Nairobi , 
Kenya and the secretariats for the major MEAs are scattered throughout the world.53 
Pursuant to the Report of the Office of Internal Oversight "the Office's 
overdependence on voluntary (extrabudgetary) funding is inappropriate, and its 
staffing composition is in some respects insufficient in number and in quality. As it 
51 Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the review of the United Nations Environment 
Programme and the administrative practices of its secretariats, including the United Nations Office in 
Nairobi (NS 1/810), available via: >http ://www.un .org/Depts/oios/reports/a5 1810/5 l-810e.htm< (last 
accessed on I O December 2003). 
52 Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the review of the United Nations Environment 
Programme and the administrative practices of its secretariats, including the United Nations Office in 
Nairobi (NS 1/810), available via: >http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/reports/a5 l 8 l 0/51-8 IOe.htm< (last 
accessed on I O December 2003). 
53 Dena Marshall An Organization For The World Environment: Three Models And Analysis (2002) 15 
Geo. lnt ' l Envtl. L. Rev. 79. 
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stands, the Office does not have the capacity to discharge its responsibilities 
adequately."54 
A Possible solutions 
A possible solution for the insufficiency of international bodies could be the 
creation of a supranational body. For example, the German Advisory Council on 
Global Change (WBGU) addresses the question of whether existing institutions 
within the United Nations framework can handle the growing challenges of global 
environmental governance, and suggests, how the existing regimes should change.55 
While the German Advisory Council on Global Change recognises that UNEP and 
other existing UN institutions currently face unhappy reputations, it proposes not to 
abolish them, but rather to restructure them gradually into a new umbrella 
organisation. 
For the purpose of the paper only two different approaches for creating a 
supranational body should be mentioned. The first consists of broadening the power 
of an existing body, the second of creating an entirely new one as the WBGU 
proposed. 
1 Broadening the Power of the Security Council or establishing a "Green 
Security Council"? 
Recently the suggestion of a Green(er) Security Council occurred in the 
international environmental law debate. This new Security Council should be 
modelled like the existing one. What is most appealing about this theory is the wide 
power of the existing Security Council, as stated in Chapter VII of the Charter. 
However, just to broaden the power of the Security Council to environmental 
54 
Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the review of the United Nations Environment 
Programme and the administrative practices of its secretariats, including the United Nations Office in 
Nairobi (N5 l/8 I 0) , available via: >http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/repons/a518 I0/51-8 l0e.htm< (last 
accessed on l O December 2003). 
55 German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), World in Transition Vol. 2: New Structures 
for Global Environmental Policy, 200 I, 3. 
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conflicts is not possible because of its "primary responsibility for maintenance of 
international peace and security". 
Also, the proposed new Green Security Council is far from its realisation. The 
suggested institution must be comparable with the existing Security Council. 
However, an amendment of the UN Charter would be necessary. Considering the 
veto power of the permanent Members, it would be not easy to amend. Not only 
would this be a time consuming process it also raises the question of two existing 
Councils side by side. 
2 An international environmental organisation 
There are three proposed organisations at the moment: the Global 
Environmental Organisation (GE0)56, the International Environmental Organisation 
(IE0)57, and the World Environmental Organisation (WE0)58 . 
All of these three proposals suggest another structure. According to its 
proponents, a GEO would be "lean, flexible, and focused on the specific challenges 
presented by international environmental problems."59 One of its central functions 
would be to be an effective response to global environmental matters. The IEO 
would be an umbrella organisation restructured out of the UNEP and other existing 
UN institutions. Further, it would be based on the WTO model. 60 The concept of the 
WEO, on the other hand, intends to "facilitate and complete environmental deal-
making".61 These proposals seem to be leading in the right direction, however, they 
are far from realisation. 
56 Daniel C. Esty & Maria H. lvanova Making International Environmental Efforts Work : The Case 
ForA Global Environmental Organisation Yale Center for Envtl L. & Pol'y Working Paper Ser., 
Working Paper No. 2/0 I, 200 I. 
57 German Advisory Council On Global Change (WBGU) World in Transition Vol. 2:New Structures 
For Global Environmental Policy (2001). 
58 John Whalley & Ben Zissimos What Could A World Environmental Organi;:.ation Do ? (2001) I Glob. 
Envtl. Pol. 29-34. 
59 Daniel C. Esty & Maria H. lvanova, n 27. 
60 German Advisory Council On Global Change (WBGU) World in Transition Vol. 2:New Structures 
For Global Environmental Policy (200 I). 
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3 Evaluation 
It would be a significant step to establish such an organisation, supervising 
treaty implementation and enforcement. The best way would be to use the existing 
network of UNEP, because it is already an organisation dedicated to environmental 
matters. On the other hand, it should not be disregarded that the establishment of a 
supranational body is likely to be opposed by one of the global major players, the 
U.S. It does not only showed its disrespect for international matters recently, but 
also refused to sign one of the global Protocols, the Kyoto Protocol. Very recently 
Russia decided also not to ratify it. These examples show today 's insecurity of 
international negotiations. It can be assumed that if global players might not be 
interested in an international solutions, the establishment of another international 
body would turn out to be almost impossible. The establishment of a supranational 
body would be desirable , however, it does not seem a viable option in the present. 
IV INSUFFICIENT ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR NGOs ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
Despite the fact that NGOs play a major role in law-making and monitoring, 
there is almost no access to justice in public interest litigation. The probability that 
a state will bring a case to the ICJ against another state, claiming that the latter 
undertakes actions harming the environment, is very small. One of the reasons is 
that most states fear counterclaims because they too have done something to harm 
the environment. 62 Johanna Riceanu points out that "expanding the scope of 
standing before the ICJ and allowing international organisations to not only use the 
advisory jurisdiction of the World Court, but also use the Court's contentious 
61 
John Whalley & Ben Zissimos What Could A World Enviro11111e11tal Organization Do ?,(200 I) I Glob. 
Envtl. Pol. 29, 30. 
62 Mary Ellen O'Connell Enforcing The New !,uemational Law Of The Environment (1992) 35 GY[L 
293,318. 
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jurisdiction in order to claim environmental harm, might bring more contentious 
cases to litigation."63 
Within the domestic legal system there is a well-developed system for 
creating and enforcing law64 despite the fact that NGOs often lack a standing. In 
comparison to international law where the law-making system is far less developed. 
Under the principles of international law established by Hugo Grotius and his 
successors, each nation is independent and sovereign. No supra-national legislature 
exists with the power to create law applicable to the entire world. Moreover, States 
are the primary subjects of international law. Few international regimes allow the 
participation of non-state actors in lawmaking. 
Consequently, the existing international law-making system is inadequate for 
dealing with global environmental challenges. The rules of international law mostly 
justify or legitimate the practical exercise of state power. 
In addition to lacking a general law-making institution, the international legal 
system remains remarkable non-democratic .65 Individuals, corporations, and other 
organisations recognised as juridical persons under the domestic law of individual 
states lack formal recognition before international courts or in other international 
fora. All these non-state actors suffer under a "procedural disability", i.e. they lack 
direct access to international fora. In most fora in the international system, 
individuals and NGOs are cuITently granted no legal standing, for example 
individual citizens completely lack standing in the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). Providing standing for NGOs to address environmental wrongs can be 
accomplished in the two ways as David A. Ardia describes: "enlarging the 
jurisdiction of current international tribunals such as the ICJ, or by granting NGOs 
standing in domestic courts through domestic implementing legislation ."66 
63 Johanna Rinceanu Enforcement Mechanism In International Environmemal Law Quo Vadunt ? Homo 
Sana In Natura Sana (2000) 15 Envtl. L. & Litig. 147. 
64 
David Hunter, James Salzmann, Durwood Zaelke (ed's) International Environmental Law and Policy 
(2"d ed, Foundation Press, New York, 2002), l 98. 
65 
David Hunter, James Salzmann, Durwood Zaelke (ed's) International Environmental Law and Policy 
(2'"1 ed, Foundation Press, NewYork, 2002), 199. 
66 
David S. Arclia Does The Emperor Ha ve No Clothes 7 Enforcement Of International Laws Protecting 
The Marin e Environment 19 Mich. J. lnt'I L., 563. 
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Individuals and or other non-state actors, which suffer harm from another 
state or the citizens of other states must rely upon their own state to employ 
international law on their behalf67, because only states have a standing before the 
International Court of Justice. 68 The states may have a legal duty to his citizens, but 
it does not have a duty to international society. More sufficient enforcement 
procedures can be achieved either by reforming an existing institution or by 
creating an entirely new one. 
Especially in the case of transnational corporations, that have the economical 
ability to move their companies around to the country with the lowest 
environmental standards, victims of environmental hazards have a only the choice 
to bring legal action to domestic courts. However, the courts wi II mainly regard the 
domestic environmental system. International environmental law aspects are not 
similarly regarded and implemented by domestic courts. 69 Moreover, it could be 
impossible to bring legal action before domestic courts at all because of procedural 
obstacles such as the forum non-convenience. 
A number of international enforcement systems exists in the United Nations 
and Europe as a regional system. They address international disputes with an 
increased focus on environmental disputes. Despite the existing alternatives of 
many international fora, each of these lack the possibility for an appropriate forum 
for individuals or NGOs seeking compulsory jurisdiction. 
Among these tribunals are the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 
International Court of Environmental Arbitration and Conciliation (ICEA), the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
67 David Hunter, James Salzmann, Durwood Zaelke (ed's) /11temational E11viron111e11tal Law and Policy 
(2 nd ed, Foundation Press, New York, 2002), 200. 
68 Article 34 Statute of the International Court of Justice. Article 34, p. l : Only states may be parties in 
cases before the Court. 
69 Peggy Rodgers Kalas flltemational Enviro11111e11tal Dispwe Resolwion And The Need For Access By 
Non-State Entities 2001, 12 Colo. J. Int'L Envtl. L. & Pol 'Y 193. 
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A Judicial Proceedings at the International Level 
In the case of dispute settlement judicial proceeding son the international 
level are insufficient for Non-state actors. International treaties, courts tribunals and 
arbitral panels traditionally limit legal access to state entities. 70 Article 2 (3) of the 
Charter of the United Nations obligates states to settle their disputes in a peaceful 
manner, while Article 33 outlines the central mechanism by which the peaceful 
settlement of disputes can be effected. However, the United Nations does not insist 
on their Members to actually settle their disputes. Furthermore, the Unites Nations 
does not require settling the disputes by legal procedures, only a peaceful way is 
required. 
Art. 33 of the UN Charter provides a range of procedures for dispute 
settlement, including arbitral and judicial measures. This paragraph will address the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Pern1anent Court of Arbitration (PCA). 
1 Judicial Proceedings- International Court of Justice (!CJ) 
The International Court of Justice acts under the patronage of the United 
Nations. The Court may accept environmental cases, however, only state have a 
standing before it. Neither Private individuals have access to the Court, nor do 
NGOs. 7 1 Because NGOs are not yet recognised as active participants in the norm-
creating process of customary international law, their activities and statements 
cannot be regarded as State practice and opinio juris in the sense of Article 38(l)(b) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 72 
70 Peggy Rodgers Kalas lntemational £11virow11e111al Dispute Resolution And The Need For Access By 
Non -State Entities (2001) 12 Colo. J. lnt ' L Envtl. L. & Pol'Y 191. 
71 Article 34 tatute of the !CJ. 
72 See Statute of the ICJ Article 38. 
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Despite the existence of the possibility to change these proceedings by 
amending the ICJ's Charter73 , this chance has not been used so far. As an good 
example for not taking this opportunity, serves the establishment of a new 
Chamber. 
The opportunity to give non-state actors access to the ICJ has not been used in 
the process of establishing a new Chamber for Environmental Matters . While the 
Chamber was established in 1993 and is presently composed of seven judges, 
elected for three years, the chance to change the proceedings before the ICJ has not 
been taken. Furthermore, this Chamber has not been used to date. Since its 
establishing the Chamber is open to criticism. One point of criticism is the fact that 
it is in the hands of the parties alone whether to refer the case to the Chamber. 74 
Further, members of the Chamber do not have any greater experience in 
environmental matters than non-member judges. Finally, under the Statute of the 
ICJ the parties are allowed to choose an ad hoe Chamber, which will consider the 
views of the parties on the composition of the Chamber.75 
Unfortunately, the possibility to give access to the ICJ for non state actors has 
not been used so far. 
2 European Court of Justice EC] 
The European Court of Justice is the judicial arm of the European Union. 
Since, the 80s the European Commission brought more than 55 cases before the 
ECJ dealing with the failure of Member States to comply with environmental 
regulations. Even more cases has been brought before the Court involving the non 
implementations of Regulations and Directives. 
The European Court of Justice, in contrast to the ICJ, had dealt with a lot 
more environmental cases. It could be assumed from this number that the ECJ has a 
wider environmental awareness than the ICJ, which is based in the European 
tradition to deal with environmental matters. 
73 Article 69 Statute of the !CJ. 
74 Article 26, p 3 Statute of the !CJ . 
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However, until today only states and EC organs have a standing before the 
Court. The most notable recent development concerning access to ju tice at EU 
level is a decision by the Court of First Instance in May 2002 opening the door for 
more access . Unfortunately, the European Court of Justice shortly thereafter (July 
2002) took a decision promptly slamming the door closed again . Some experts 
speculate that the European Court of Justice prefers to wait for a better case upon 
which to base a change in its jurisprudence.76 
The recent developments in the European scheme of public participation will 
be further analysed in the scope of the proposed Directive on Environmental 
Liability and, most importantly, the very recent proposed Directive on access to 
justice in environmental matters. 
3 Arbitral Proceedings - Permanent Court of Arbitration ( PCA) 
On June 19, 2001 the PCA Administrative Council adopted the Optional 
Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to the Environment and/or Natural 
Resources ("Environmental Rules") .77 These new rules advanced the proceedings of 
the PCA. Now any combination of parties is possible. Meaning that States, NGO's, 
multilateral corporation and individuals can be a party before the PCA and even a 
multi -party arbitration is admission . Open to criticism is the absence of compulsory 
jurisdiction. 78 
5 International Environmental Court ? 
In recent years the problem of enforcing international environmental law was 
addressed by the proposal for an International Environmental Court, that should 
76 Seminarreport of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), New Chances for Better Enforcement of 
EU En vironmental Legislation, 20'h September 2002, Brussels, 71 . 
77 <http://www .pca-cpa.org/E GLISH/EDR/> (last accessed on 19.07.2003). 
78 Charles Qiong Wu A Unified Fon1111 ? Th e Ne 11 Arbitration Rules For E11viro11111e11tal Disputes Under 
Th e Permanent Courr Of Arbitration (2000) 3 Chi . J. lnt ' l L. 263,264. 
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allow more participation by non-state entities. 79 Therefore, in 1989, the Hague 
Declaration on the Environment called for the creation of a new institutional 
authority within the UN system.80 
To support this proposition there have to be proved that existing institutions 
are not sufficient to deal with international environmental disputes and that they 
cannot be transformed to an institution that is able to deal with these disputes. 81 
Even if this will be proved, the problem of its establishment is still remaining. The 
IEC could would possible only be realised through a multilateral treaty. However, 
such a treaty is not in sight and states seem to be reluctant to give up a further piece 
of their sovereignty to create this new institution. This position is supported by their 
lack of enthusiasm to bring disputes before other, existing, international courts and 
tribunals. 
6 The Role of NGOs as Amici Curiae and Public Interest Litigators m 
International Judicial Bodies 
NGOs are especially active as am1c1 curiae 111 the regional human rights 
systems of the Americas and Europe. 82 The European Court of Human Rights , after 
first showing reluctance to allow NGOs to submit amicus briefs in pending cases, 
permitted third party intervention in some cases and then amended Article 37(2) of 
its Rules of Procedure in 1982 to create an explicit legal basis for these 
submissions. 
Through litigation NGO participate as am1c1 cunae 111 international judicial 
bodies and contribute to the development of international law. NGOs acting in this 
79 See e.g. Amedeo Postiglione Essay: A More Efficient lntemational Law 011 The Environment And 
Setting Up An Intemational Co11rt For The E11viro11111em Within The United Nations (I 990) 20 Envtl. L. 
321 ; Philippe Sands in Jacob Werksman (ed) The /11te rnatio11al Co11rt of Justice and the E11ropea11 Court 
of Justice in Greening International lnstitwions (Earthscan, London 1996) 219-35; Kenneth F. Mc 
Callion & H Rajan Sharma E11viro11me111a/ Justice Withow Borders: The Need For An lntemational 
Court Of The Environment To Protect Fundamental E11viro11111ental Rights (2000) 32 Geo. Wash. J. Int'I 
L. & Econ. 35 I. 
80 Hague Declaration on the Environment, 11 March 1989, U .. Doc. AJ44/340, 28 IL.M. 1308, 1309-
10 ( I 989). 
81 Sean D. Murphy Does The World Need A New lntemational Enviro11111ental Co11rt ? (2000) 32 Geo. 
Wash. J. lnt ' I L. & Econ. 333, 333. 
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way can influence the interpretation and sometimes the creation of international law 
through international courts and tribunals.83 
In the later on more analysed example of Greenpeace v. Commission, where 
the NGO challenged a decision of the Commission of the European before the 
European Court of Justice they were denied locus standi before the Court. 84 
INTERIM-CONCLUSION: Non of the existing fora is able to help global 
environmental disputes and in the most of them neither NGOs nor individual have a 
standing. In the case where they have a standing, the fora only give advisory or 
consultative opinions, meaning no compulsory jurisdiction is provided. In addition, 
the tool of "amici curiae" is not very helpful, because it does not provide the same 
rights as a claimant have. Therefore, their interests and the public interest of the 
environment are not are protected and the enforcement of international 
environmental law is insufficient. 
V ARHUS CONVENTION - RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF PARTICIPATORY 
RIGHTS 
One giant step forward in the development of international law in the field of 
environmental democracy was the adoption of the Aarhus Convention. A key 
element in saving the environment is the strengthening of citizens ' environmental 
rights so that these members of the public and their repre entative organisations can 
play a full and active role in environmental law. 85 
82 Dinah Shelton The Participation Of Non -Governmental Organi-;:.ations in International Judicial 
Proceedings 88 AM. J. I T'L L. 611, 619 ( 1994). 
8
' Karsten owrot Legal Consequences Of Clobali::.ation: The Status Of Non Covernmemal 
Organizations Under International Law 6 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 632. 
84 See Greenpeace and Others v. Commission 1995 ECR II, 2209, para. 60. 
85 UN/ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in dec1s10n-Making and Access 
to Ju tice in Environmental Matters The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide (United Nations, 
New York and Geneva, 2000)Y. 
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In recent years there have been an impressive development in terms of 
participatory rights of GOs and individuals on the European level. The most 
important legal instrument in terms of participatory rights is the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. 
It was adopted on 25 June 1998 in the Danish city of Arhus (Aarhus) at the Fourth 
Ministerial Conference in the "Environment for Europe" process. 86 It is also open 
to Non-EC Members. It entered into force on 30 October 2001. At an extra-
ordinary meeting of the Parties, held on 21 May 2003 in Kiev, 36 States and the 
European Community signed the Protocol at the Meeting of the Parties.87 It i 
therefore the first international instrument of increasing environmental democracy. 
On the Second meeting of the Task Force on Access to Justice in Geneva 20-21 
November 2003 the Aarhus package was adopted by the European Community. 
Its importance was described by Kofi A. Annan: 
"Although regional in scope, the significance of the Aarhus Convention is global. It is 
by far the most impressive elaboration of principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, which stresses 
the need for citizen's participation in environmental issues and for access to information on 
the environment held by public authorities. As such it i the most ambitious venture in the 
area of 'environmental democracy' so far undertaken under the auspices of the United 
Nations." Kofi A. Annan 
The Aarhus Convention lays down the basic rules to promote citizens' 
involvement in environmental matters and enforcement of environmental law, by 
establishing a number of rights of the public (citizens and their associations) with 
regard to the environment. Public authorities (at national, regional or local level) 
are to contribute to allowing these rights to become effective. The Aarhus 
Convention consists of three pillars, each of which grants different rights to the 
public. The first pillar gives the right of the right of everyone to receive 
86 
UN/ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters, that was adopted and signed, also by the Community. at the fourth 
ministerial conference in Arhus (Denmark), 23-25 June 1998. In the following "Aarhus Convention". 
87 <http://www.unece.org/env/pp/> last accessed on 10. ovember 2003. 
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environmental information that is held by public authorities ("access to 
environmental information - Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention")88 ; the second 
one gives the right to take these comments into due account in decision-making, 
and information to be provided on the final decisions and the reasons for it ("public 
participation in environmental decision-making- Article 7 of the Aarhus 
Convention"); and, finally, the third pillar provides the right to challenge, in a court 
of law, public decisions that have been made without respecting the two 
aforementioned rights or environmental law in general ("access to justice - Article 
9 (2) & (4) of the Aarhus Convention"). 89 
The Aarhus Convention is a milestone in the history of environmental 
agreements. It links government accountability and environmental protection by 
granting the aforementioned rights to the public and imposes on Parties and public 
authorities obligations regarding access to information and public participation and 
access to justice.90 Article 13 of the Preamble of the Aarhus Convention empha 1s 
the role NGOs can play in environmental protection. 91 
VI STATUS QUO OF PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL 
CuJTently, at EU level, there is no possibility for environmental organisations 
or environmentally concerned citizens to bring cases before the European Court of 
Justice challenging actions or omissions by the EU institutions (in particular, the 
European Commission).92 This is not entirely true, because, in fact, there is an 
action at the European level, which will turn out to be insufficient, that is stipulated 
88 This can include information on the state of the environment, but also on policies or measures taken , 
or on the stale of human health and safety where thi can be affected by the state of the environment. 
Citizens are entitled to obtain this information within one month of the request and without having to say 
why they require it. In addition, public authorities are obliged, under the Convention, to actively 
disseminate environmental information in their possession. 
89 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/aarhus/> (last accessed on 24 October 2003). 
90 <http://www.unece.org/env/pp/> last accessed on I O ovember 2003. 
91 "l I 3] Recognizing further the importance of the respective roles that individual citizens, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector can play in environmental protection." 
92 Seminarreport of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), New Chances for Better Enforcement of 
EU Environmental Legislation, 20th September 2002, Brussels, 71. 
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m Article 230, p. 4 EC Treaty. However, this sole legal action 1s an insufficient 
instrument to safeguard environmental interests. This analysis will be followed by 
recent developments in the area of participatory rights with respect to historical 
reasons for this progress. 
A Action of voidness - Article 230 p. 4 EC Treaty 
Until today , NGOs do not have general access to justice and there are only a 
few legal actions for them against decisions of a European organ. Only Article 230, 
p. 4 EC Treaty grants a standing to associations before the European Court, if they 
are affected by a decisions of the Council or the Commission.93 
However, the jurisdiction of the ECJ and the Court of the first instance, m 
reality only one European body, is indifferent in terms of legal standing for 
organisations. Reich concluded that : "The court will, under certain circumstances, 
grant standing to associations, though it has not shaped a specific theory on this 
matter. "94 Whether this conclusion is right will be evaluated in the following 
paragraph. 
1 special legitimacy preconditions of Article 230, p. 4 EC Treaty 
Article 230, p. 4 stipulates: Any natural or legal person may, under the same 
condi tion s, institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a 
decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another 
person, is of direct and individual concern lo the former. 
At the first glance we have to acknowledge that there is no limitation of the 
potential subjects that have a right to sue. Every natural or legal person has a right 
to sue. Basic constellation of Article 230, p.4 EC Treaty is the challenge of a 
93 Article 230, p. I EC Treaty (amended by the Treaty of Nice): The court of Just ice shall review the 
lega lity of acts adopted jo intly by the European Parliament and the Council, of Acts of the Council, of 
the Commission of the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European 
Parliament intended to produce lega l effects vis-a-vis third parties. 
94 Reich in Micklitz/Reich (ed's) Public !merest Litigation before European Courts ) omos 
Yerlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1996), 14. 
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decision which was addressed to the claimant. In this case there are no further 
requirements for the claimant. However, actions of voidness of non-addressees are 
only possible with some limitations. on-addressees must prove that the decision 
concerns them directly and individually. Therefore, the most difficult requirement 
for a successful application by associations is being "directly and individually 
concerned". 
(a) Definition of "decision" 
The first problem in this context is the definition of "decision". Even if the 
legal act in not named as a decision, it could be a decision in the sense of Article 
230 p.4 EC Treaty with the consequence that it could be challenged. 95 For the legal 
definition only the objective criteria are important. 96 Thus, a decision is an 
individual action which refers to a single individual case and has legal external 
effects. 97 Further problems could arise from the distinction between a regulation 
and a decision, that Article 230, p. 4 EC Treaty stipulates. However, the distinction 
seems to be more and more irrelevant, as long as the complainant proves that 
he/she/it is directly and individually concerned.98 
(b) "individually concerned" 
The problem of an action by a non-addressee is to be " individually and 
directly concerned". This was first brought on the agenda with a case Greenpeace 
raised against the commission, challenging the decision to built two power-plants 
on the Canary Islands. Greenpeace submitted that the Commission had financed 
two oil power plants without checking their ecofriendliness. The Court of the first 
instance stated in its decision that neither individuals, nor GOs that are not 
individually concerned, have a standing before a European Court.99 The ECJ 
95 Borries Ahrens Die Klagebefugnis voll Verbi.illdell im Europiiisclzell Cemeinschaftsreclzt, ( omos, 
Baden-Baden, 200 I) 98. 
96 See for example the decisions of the ECJ 19-22/62 - Federation ationale de la Boucherie en gros, 
60/81 - IBM. 
97 Relevant deci sion of the ECJ: 60/8 I - IBM . 
98 Borries Ahrens Die Klagebefugnis VOil Verbi.illden im Europi.iischen Cemeinschaftsrechr. ( omos, 
Baden-Baden, 200 I) I 03. 
99 T-585/93, 9 August 1995. 
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decided, being the Court of the final instance, as well that the claimants were not 
individually concerned in the sense that is stipulated by Article 230 EC Treaty.' 00 
The requirement of being individually concerned deals with the direct effect 
of the decision. Directly concerned is an individual or association only in the case if 
the challenged decision results m an infringement without any further 
circumstances. 101 This criteria has been the subject of criticisms since it has been 
established. 102 Main point of criticism has been the criteria of individualism, 
because it seemed to imply that nobody else could be concerned in that way, except 
the addressee. Nevertheless, the ECJ had a very strict interpretation of this criteria 
until 1977. Since then, one could be individually concerned, if the person or legal 
entity has been participated in the forgoing procedure. 103 This new criteria is 
mainly important in cases dealing with competition law. In fact, competition and 
trade law issues have been the reason to change the mind of the ECJ. 
Until October 2003, the Community Law did not oblige the Member states to 
implement an altruistic legal action of organisations in their states. Organisations 
do not have a general standing before the EC Courts so far, however, it should be 
mentioned that there is a possibility for NGOs to raise environmental issues. The 
most important tool is the possibility to lodge an environmental complaint before 
the European Ombudsman. '04 For this remedy no individual concern is necessary. 
Nevertheless, the complaint does not have the same legal consequences as an action 
does. 
Non-egoistic (altruistic) legal actions serve the purpose of suing for general 
reasons like the public welfare, instead of an egoistic reason and/or a personal 
interest. There are some older provisions that provided an obligation to establish a 
,oo C-321/95, 2 April I 998. 
101 Borries Ahrens Die Klagebefug11is von Verbiinde11 i111 Europdischen Ce111ei11schaftsreclzt (Nomos, 
Baden-Baden, 2001) 105. 
102 See for example: Gerl icolaysen An111erkunge11 ::. 11 den Urteilen £CJ 10168 and 18/68- Eridania, 
EuR 1970, 161. 
103 ECJ 24/76 - Metro. 
104 In 1998, for example, the European Ombudsman received I 372 Complaints- 237 from individuals, 63 
from organisations/ GOs and 60 from companies. Most of these complaints dealt with the claim of not 
receiving environmental information. 
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legal standing in the Member States. However, a standing has only been granted 
limited to very particular cases. 
2 Problems of the "concept of interest" 
In so far as the implementation of legal actions of organisations is a duty of 
the Member States. Further, it has to be questioned whether NGOs might be 
entitled to have access to justice detached from an individual interest (without the 
designed European provisions.) 
Such a right could only arise from the concept of interest which is inherent to 
European Law, 230 EC treaty. The organisations would be concerned in their 
interest when the provision in questions deals with interests and purposes that the 
organisation states in their statutes. 
Some authors consider the opinion that the European system implies the 
possibility for a legal action for organisation because the European system does not 
only deal with the special individual interests. However, this statement, on which 
the author of this paper agrees is followed by the thought that therefore, it is not 
necessary to implement a legal standing for NGOs. 105 This is considered to be true 
in the case when individual interests are concerned. As long as the rights of 
individuals are concerned, that are members of the NGO, the NGO itself is also 
concerned in the sense that it can argue a violation of NGO rights. In this case the 
right to sue is given to the NGO and a special provision stating an action is not 
necessary. 
However, this view is highly arguable. A system based on the general concept 
that interest could be either altruistic or individual is much more open to the idea 
of a legal standing of NGOs as other systems. Nevertheless, the implementation of 
such an action would still be necessary. The mere implication of such an action is 
not enough to constitutes a sufficient right for organisations. Without such a legal 
statement the authorisation for an action would not be ensured enough. 
Consequently, it would not be possible to sue a public authority without problems. 
105 Astrid Epiney, Kaspar Sollberger, Zugang :::u Cerichten und gerichtliche Kontrolle im Umweltrecht, 
(Erich Schmidt Verlag Gmbh & Co KG, Berlin, 2002) 387. 
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If we consider the opposite, it is unlikely that the need for the implementation 
of individual legal access rights would be denied considering the case that the 
European system would be based on the implied view that individuals have a 
legally subjective right. 
The problematic of the view that the right to sue should only arise from the 
violation of individual rights, is that every single provision must be examined 
whether it really states an individual right. 106 It is highly unlikely that this special 
character could be proven in every European environmental provision . Therefore 
the implementation of a legal action for organisations is not unnecessary. This 
action would make the need to prove the individuals rights protecting character of a 
provision, which can be highly debated, dispensable and would allow a legal action 
of NGO also in the case where such a provision is not considered. 
In addition, a general duty of the Member states to provide extensive 
possibilities to enforce a non-compliance with the Community law by the way of a 
legal action could not be derived from the general duty of effective application of 
community law. This principle is meant by Article 10 EC Treaty .101 The basic 
principle of the autonomy of the Member States with regard to administrative 
procedures and administration of justice is inherent to the Community law. This 
principle would be endangered by implying a duty to provide extensive legal access 
out of Article 10 EC Treaty, because it would imply an insufficiency of the 
Member States. 108 
B Other European Instruments providing provisions for public participation 
1 Directives 90/313 and 85/337 
First to mention is the Directive 90/313 for free access to environmental 
information. This Directive dealt with the right of the Member States and of every 
natural or legal entity to apply to administration to receive environmental 
106 A trid Epiney, Kaspar Sollberger, Zugang w Geric!uen 1111d gerichtliche Kontrolle im Umweltrecht 
(Erich Schmidt Verlag Gmbh & Co KG, Berlin,2002) 388. 
107 See for the jurisdiction of the ECJ: ECJ Rs. C-213/89, Slg. 1990, 1-2433; ECJ Rs. C-217/88, Slg 
1990, 1-2879; ECJ, Rs. C-19/92, Slg. 1993, 1- 1663. 
108 Astrid Epiney, n I 04, 391. 
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information without a proven interest. In the case this application for access is 
rejected the Member States have to provide an judicial procedure to control this 
decision. 109 The right to free access for environmental information is for everybody, 
therefore even environmental NGOs have this right. Taking the provision of the 
Directive into account which stipulates the need for a judicial procedure, we can 
conclude, that there must also be a way for NGOs to get this decision and to have 
legal access to the Courts. In this respect, the Community Law provides a duty for 
the Member states to implement the right for a legal action for organisations. 
Although, it seems a sufficient way to safeguard environmental interests, it is 
a weak instrument, because the possibility to challenge a dec ision existed only in 
the narrow case of not receiving environmental information. Even if the GO got 
the information afterwards, there is no possibility to challenge a decision based on 
these infom1ation. In addition, there is no way to challenge the value of the 
information itself. The legal action is beschrankt of the right to have an insight into 
the environmental information and nothing more. 
Moreover, there is a number of Community environmental provisions that 
provide different legal rights for single persons or entities. For example Article 6 
section 2 of the Directive 85/337 110 concerning ecofriendliness, states that the 
Member states have to provide possibilities for the "public" to participate in the 
applications. The public shall have a right to have access to the applications and 
have a further right to consider the facts before the application will be granted. All 
these provisions raise the question of a definition of the term " public". It is not 
clear and not defined which persons are addressed by this term. The mentioned 
Directive give a range for implementing these rights . However, from the author's 
point of view, it should be clear that for reaching the best legal effects the term 
"public" must compromise all the persons that might be affected by the applications 
and the following permits. These persons must not be necessarily individuals but 
could also be legal entities. 
109 Article 4 Directive 90/313. 
110 Directive on the proof of ecofriendliness (UmweltvertraglichkeitsprUfung-UYP). 
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A differentiation between altruistic and egoistic matters is not known to these 
provisions. Furthermore, a consideration of NGOs arises from the purpose of such 
provisions providing legal access to information in that sense as they shall ensure a 
comprehensive consideration of interests. 
VII RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
A Directive 2003/35 
Since signing the Aarhus Convention in 1998, the EC has taken important 
step to restructure the approach of public authorities to openness and transparency. 
All 15 EC Member States have signed the Convention. evertheless, ratification is 
proceeding slowly in most Member States. 111 It updated existing legal provisions in 
order to meet the requirements of the Arhus Convention. In particular, two 
directives concerning access to environmental information and public participation 
in environmental decision-making , "first" and "second pillar" of the Arhus 
Convention have been adopted by the European Parliament and the Council earlier 
in 2003. They have to be implemented in national law by 2005. 
In tenns of public access to environmental information the main instrument is 
Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 
2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council 
Directive 90/313/EEC. 11 2 A more recent development is Directive 2003/35/EC1 13 by 
amending article 15 a (a), (b) of the Directive 96/61/EC. 114 The amended Article 15 
111 Seminarreporl of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), New Chcmcesfor Beller Enforcement 
of EU Enviro11111emal Legislation, 20th September 2002, Brussels, 71. 
112 OJ L 41 of 14.02.2003, p. 26. 
113 "Directive 2003/35/EC providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans 
and programmes concerning the environment and amending with regard to public participation and 
access to justice Directives 85/337 /EEC and 96/61 /EC", adopted 25.06.2003. 
114 Article 15 a: Member States shall ensure that, in accordance with the relevant national legal system, 
members of the public concerned: (a) have a sufficient interest , or alternatively, (b) maintaining the 
impairment of a right, where administrative procedural law of a Member State requires this as a 
precondition; have access to a review procedure before court of law ... What constitutes a sufficient 
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(b) reads now: What constitutes a sufficient interest and impairment of a right shall 
be determined by the Member States, consistently with the objective of giving the 
public concerned wide access to justice (emphasis added). 
Recently , the European Commission proposed two Directives. One concerns 
environmental liability and deals partly with participatory rights. This Directive 
will be analysed, because it excellently illustrates the competing values between 
economy and environment. The second proposed Directive deals expressive ly with 
access to justice in environmental matters and will be examined afterwards. 
B Proposed Directive On Environmental Liability 
1 Definition 
After this overview, the paper will embark on the analysis of the proposed 
Directive on environmental liability. The Proposal for a European Directive on 
Environmental liability supports the thesis that liability enforces existing standards 
and is a powerful deterrent against non-compliance. 11 5 This Directive was proposed 
in 2002 and has recently been amended in May 2003. It is based on the European 
White Paper on environmental liability .116 Before embarking on analysing the 
participatory rights in a recent proposed Directive on environmental liability, it 
seems practical to explain the term of environmental liability. 
In the European context, environmental liability is defined as an obligation to 
pay. This definition is given by the EC in the White paper on environmental 
liability. In this paper, the Commission states "environmental liability makes the 
causer of environmental damage (the polluter) pay for the remedying the damage 
that he has caused." 11 7 The definition is clearly influenced by the effort of the EC to 
interest and impairment of a right shall be determined by the Member States, consistently with the 
objective of giving the public concerned wide access lo justice. 
115 Proposa l for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Counci I on environmental liability 
with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, COM (2002) 17 final, 4.,6. 
116 White paper on environmental liability, COM (2000) 66 final, 9 February 2000. 
11 7 While paper on environmental liability, COM (2000) 66 final , 9 February 2000, 7. 
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implement the polluter pays principle and does not include other measures of 
definitions. 
The polluter-pays- principle is mentioned in Article 174 (2) of the EC 
Treaty. 11 8 It implies that it is the polluter who must bear the costs of an 
environmental damage, because he is responsible for it. 11 9 This principle is the 
theory behind most economical environmental instruments. It imposes the social 
costs of environmental pollution directly on the producer, whereas usually these 
external costs are borne by the public or the victims of pollution. 120 
Not all kind of damages can be remedied through environmental liability. It is 
not a suitable tool for diffuse damage and wide spreading pollution, becau e in 
these cases it is impos ible to link the damage to activities of certain individual 
actors. 121 
2 Green Paper on remedying environmental damage 122 and Resolution of 20 
April 1994123 
In May 1993, the Commission published its Green Paper on remedying 
environmental damage. In 1994, a resolution called on the Commi sion to submit 
"a proposal for a directive on civil liability in respect of future environmental 
damage." 124 This resolution was based on Article 192 (2) of the EC Treaty, which 
enables the Parliament to ask for submission of a legislative proposal. 
In following debates the Commission decided to reply to the resolution by 
preparing a White Paper on environmental liability . Furthermore, in the light of the 
11 8 "Community policy on the environment shall be [ ... ] based on the precautionary principle and on the 
principle that preventive action should be take n, that environmental damage should as a priority be 
rectified at source and that the polluter should pay." 
119 http://www.bvdm-online.de/uw lex ikon/v/verursacherpri nzip.nclk(last accessed 22.September 2003 ). 
120 Sanford E. Gaines, Ricardo Katz Nonregulatory Approaches To Environmental Protection For Cuba: 
Lessons From The United States And Chile (2003) I 6 Tu!. Envtl. L. J.848.; Sanford E. Gaines From 
Economic Equicy To Environ111emal Ee hos, ( 1991) 26 Tex. lnl' I L.J .463. 
121 While Paper, 13. 
122 Communication of 14 May 1993 (COM (93) 47 final) presented lo the Council, the Parliament and 
the Economic and Social Committee. 
123 Resolulionof20April 1994(0JC 128,9.5.1994). 
124 Resolution of 20 Apri I 1994 (OJ C 128, 9.5.1994, 165). 
43 
Treaty of Amsterdam an environmental liability regime will bring better integration 
of environmental considerations in all sectors. 125 
3 European White Paper on Environmental Liability 09 February 2000 
The crucial incident for a European approach to environmental liability was 
the case of oil spills near the European coast. These events raised the question of 
who should pay for the environmental damage. In addition, it clarified the rivalry 
between private financial economical interests and environmental interests. The 
European Community decided that not the taxpayer, as usual , should bear the costs, 
but the polluter. The White Paper aimed at implementing the polluter-pays-
principle as one of the main reasons for introducing an EC liability regime. It is 
said that a proper liability regime will help to enforce existing environmental 
standards. Furthermore, it is a way to balance competing interests in environmental 
law and strengthen the safeguards of environmental interests. 
(a) Access to Justice -Enforcement 
A case of environmental damage differs from traditional cases of damage in 
the way that the protection of the environment is a public interest, whereas, in 
traditional cases, personal goods and rights are concerned. Due to the public 
interest the state has the first responsibility to act if the environment is or is 
threatens to be damaged. 126 In recent years, there is growing acknowledgement that 
the public has to become aware that the whole " public" civilisation should be 
responsible for the environment. The Commission has refen-ed to the need for such 
an enhanced access to justice in its communication to the Council and Parliament, 
entitled "Implementing Community environmental law" 127 . 
125 The treaty of Amsterdam introduced in Article 6 of the EC Treaty the principle that environmental 
protection requirements must be integrated into definition and implementation of other Community 
policies and activities. 
126 White Paper, 22. 
127 COM (96) SOO final. 
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(i) The two-tier approach 
In terms of enforcement, a two-step access to justice has been proposed. In 
the first place, the state should be responsible. Public interest groups promoting 
environmental protection shall be deemed to have an interest in environmental 
decision-making128 (first tier). If the state does not exercise its right, a legal action 
instituted by an association (organisations) is proposed, i.e. public interests groups 
have the right to act on a subsidiary basis (second tier). This legal action should 
apply to judicial and administrative review and, in addition , to tort-claims against 
the polluter. The White Paper concluded that the most appropriate option for 
European environmental liability would be a European Directive. 
The unamended proposal of 2002 aims to establish a framework whereby 
environmental damage would be prevented or remedied. It defines environmental 
damage in the context of its factual application framework. The factual application 
framework of the Directive shall be reduced to three types of damages (Art.3 Absl 
& 2 Abs.18): damages with respect to biodiversity, to water and to soi l/ land 
contamination.129 
(c) Enforcement by citizens 
The access to justice scheme applies the two-tier approach, which was 
proposed in the White Paper. In the first place domestic environmental authorities 
will be responsible for enforcing provision in tenns of restoring and precaution 
environmental damages of bigger impact. In addition, supplemental procedural 
rights, without prejudice to any investigation initiated by the competent authority, 
should be given to persons adversely affected or likely to be adversely affected by 
128 Article 2 (I) of the Arhus Convention. 
129 Biodiversity: which is protected at the Community levels, waters covered by the Water Framework 
Directive and human health when the source of the threat to human health is land contamination. 
environmental damage and to qualified entities 111 the area of environmental 
protection. These legal subjects shall be entitled to submit any observations relating 
to the damage to the competent authority and request it to take action under the 
proposed Directive. 130 The competent authority has to investigate the case and 
decide what action to take. This decision should be communicated to the applicant. 
To review the decision following such a request, the concerned persons and the 
entities should have access to court or another independent and competent body.131 
It must be emphasised, that there will be no possibility for individuals or 
entities to take direct legal action against the polluter. However, for individuals 
there will be the possibility to sue the polluter under civil liability procedures. 
(i) Scope of access to justice 
(ii) Scope of access to justice for individuals 
The right of individuals to take legal action against the competent authority is 
not new. In German environmental law, for example, the right to sue originates 
from a personal infringement in individual rights. 132 The directly affected person 
has a right to sue if the relevant environmental provisions also serve for protection 
of individual rights and not only for protection of common welfare. 
From the authors point of view, in terms of the new Directive, the question 
will occur, whether the scope of the access to justice will be interpreted widely or 
nan-owly. Article 14 (1) only stipulates "adversely affected or likely to be affected". 
It is not clear whether this effect must reach an impact on personal rights or 
whether is it sufficient to claim an impact in aesthetic or ecological well-being. 
130 Article 14, I. 
111 Article 15 , I. 
132 Section 42 Verwallungsgerichtsordnunng (VwGO). 
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(ii) Scope of access to justice for qualified legal entities 
Qualified legal entities, like approved environmental NGOs, are entitled to 
sue despite the claim of an invasion of a specific personal right of their own, or in 
terms of their members. This results in implementing a legal action of organisations 
in a way that does not exist so far. 
Germany, for example, has an non-individual (altruistic) legal action of an 
organisation in its Conservation Act. 133 However, the scope of the proposed 
Directive is wider because it does not only refer to conservation, but also includes 
water and soil. In the European context the proposal is a new way of enforcing, 
because a legal action of organisations is not established at the European level so 
far. 
(ii) Criticism 
This new legal instrument might be a good way to improve environmental 
liability and its enforcement. However, at the European level it could collide with 
existing jurisprudence of the ECJ and the Court of first instance, the EC. 
Six environmental organisations, BirdLife International, Greenpeace, the 
European Environmental Bureau, Friends of the Earth Europe, WWF and Seas at 
Risk were mainly concerned about the citizens' access to justice. They stated that: 
"The Directive must ensure that all "qualified entities" are given the right to take 
direct legal action in the case of imminent damage to the environment." 134 Because 
of transboundary pollution, globalisation and to do justice to the rise of GOs in 
the last decades the need for enhanced access to justice had become clear in the 
debate about the Directive on environmental liability. 
133 Section 61 BNatSchG. Qualified environmental organisations have the right to sue arising not only 
the invasion of individual rights but they can also reprove interests of common weal. 
134 >hllp://www.eeb.org/press/pr_liability_directive_04_03_03.htm< (last accessed 10 December 2003). 
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C Proposed Directive on access to justice in environmental matters 
Very recently, the European Commission released a proposal for a Directive 
on access to justice in environmental matters. 135 One of the principles of the 
ambitious Aarhus Convention is to enable the public to assume responsibility for 
the environment by granting them the right to bring violations of environmental law 
before a court. This proposal will allow citizens as well as their organisations to 
play their part in the enforcement of environmental law. 
This very recent proposal for a Directive should covers two objectives aiming 
at a better enforcement of environmental law. First, it shall contribute to the 
implementation of Aarhus Convention, mainly its third pillar, and secondly, it shall 
accomplish shortcomings in controlling the application of environmental law.136 
For the intention of this paper the proposed Directive will only be examined in 
terms of the first aim aforementioned by the Directive. 
Article 4 of the proposed Directive establishes the criteria for determining 
which members of the public have legal standing. Members of the public must have 
a sufficient interest in the related administrative act or omission or maintain the 
impairment of a right, where the administrative procedural law of the Member 
States concerned requires this as a precondition to have access to review 
procedures. "Members of the public" means one or more natural or legal persons, 
and their associations, organisations or groups .137 
However, with setting up these criteria, the reasons the Commission gives for 
deciding against a general right of lega l standing for every natural persons are as 
follows: Because the generali ed requirement of an "actio popularis" is 
incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity in the light of the fact that the 
135 Proposa l for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to justice in 
environmental matters, Brussels, 24 October 2003, COM (2003) 624 final, 2003/0246 (COD). 
136 Explanatory memorandum, page 2 via: <http://europa.eu.in t/comm/environment/aarhus/# !>last 
accessed on 15 November 2003. 
137 Article 2 (b). 
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Aarhus Convention leaves the possibility of laying down criteria under national 
law_11s 
Article 5 of the proposed Directive states legal standing of qualified entities. 
"Qualified entity" means any association, organisation or group, which has the 
objective to protect the environment and is recognised according to the procedure 
laid down in Article 9. 139 These certain groups will not be required to have a 
sufficient interest or maintain the impairment of a right. They have access to justice 
without having a sufficient interest or maintaining an impairment of a right. The 
matter of review in respect of which an action is brought must be covered 
specifically by the statutory activities of the qualified entity and the review falls 
within the specific geographical area of activities of that entity. 140 The criteria for 
being recognised as a qualifying entity are extensively stated in Article 9. 
1 Criticism of the proposed Directive on access to justice in environmental 
matters 
The proposal is by all means a historical step towards an improvement of 
environmental democracy. Nevertheless, it could have been more forward-looking. 
A broader provision, meaning a general legal standing without the restrictions to 
interests, the impairment of rights or the need to be a qualified entity are subject of 
criticism by NGOs. 141 Against an "actio popularis" has been said that it would lead 
to an unwanted increase in actions before the courts and could lead to misuse. 
However, these arguments have not been proofed. An increase in litigation has not 
been surveyed. A Swiss study proofed that NGOs do not mi use their legal standing 
and that the success rate of their actions is over 50 %. 142 
138 Explanatory memorandum, page 12 via: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/aarhus/# !>last 
accessed on I 5 ovember 2003. 
ll
9 Article 2 (c). 
140 Article 5 (I). 
141 Explanatory memorandum, page 9 via: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/aarhus/# l>last 
accessed on 15 November 2003. 
142 Borries Ahrens Die Klagebef11gnis vo11 Verbiinden i111 Europi:iischen Ge111ei11schaftsrecht, (Nomos, 
Baden- Baden, 200 J) I 07. 
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In the reasoning of the proposed Directive the Commission states that an 
"actio popularis" is not explicitly required by the Aarhus Convention, and 
therefore, will not be implemented in the Directive. 143 However, the criteria of 
being a qualified entity, stipulated in Article 5, has also not be addressed by the 
Aarhus Convention as the Commission acknowledge itself.144 Nevertheless, the 
Commission describes these criteria extensively in its proposal , despite the fact that 
these criteria has been the subject of criticism by NGOs for a long time. Usually 
these criteria shall ensure that NGOs do not misuse their right , but as mentioned 
above, this has never been the case. A further point of criticism concerns the 
criteria themselves. From the authors point of view, particularly that the claimed 
environmental wrong must fall within the specific geographical area of activities of 
an entity is unnecessary and will create problems in the future. Two kind of 
problems occur within this scope. One problem could either be that there is no 
entity which was active in this geographical area before the environmental wrong; 
or that an existing entity, while the environmental matters are covered specifically 
by its statutory activities, these activities never were in this geographical area, 
because the specific environmental wrongs were never done in this area before. 
This will be especially true in terms of the enlargement of the EU. There are 
probably fewer environmental NGOs, e.g. in Turkey or Slovenia, concerning 
themselves with whatever potential environmental harms will be done in the future. 
These NGOs will possibly not have the opportunity to use the access to justice 
provided by Article 5. These concerns are the more alarming as the tates that will 
join the EU have a lesser status quo of environmental law than the most Member 
States. 
Furthermore, it is said in terms of criticism that legal actions of organisations 
are only focused on political problems rather than on judicial problems. This, 
however, is certainly not true as the high rate of judicial succe these actions have 
implies. 
143 Explanatory memorandum, page 9 via: <http://europa.eu.int/conun/environment/aarhus/# !>last 
accessed on 15 November 2003. 
144 Explanatory memorandum, page 13 via: <http ://europa.eu.int/comm/env1ron ment/aarhus/# !>last 
accessed on 15 November 2003. 
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VIII CONCLUSION 
Two main problems are responsible for improper enforcement of national and 
international environmental law. First to mention is that environmental law lacks 
private financial interest. This lack is responsible for the insufficiency of existing 
monitoring bodies and partially for the lack of access to justice for NGOs. States 
concern themselves rather with economical issues than environmental issues, i.e. 
environmental problems are not regarded as important as trade issues for example. 
Therefore, states will not go before international courts because of the fear that 
another state might reveal environmental wrongs of the party that originally went to 
court. 
Secondly, the environment 1s a res communis and often environmental 
decisions do not tackle individual interests, but "only" the environemnt. 
Nevertheless, does the European system only allow actions by parties that are 
individually concerned. 
In recent years, however, NGOs filled this niche with their participation in 
law-making and monitoring. This development is not surprising, because GOs are 
well equipped to enforce environmental law. They are not bound to political 
interests of states and often have the advantage of being independently funded. 
Their increased influence must be acknowledged by an increase in access to justice. 
The Aarhus Convention was a first and important step to more environmental 
democracy. Although it is regional in scope, it is a milestone and sets an example 
for the international community. It will have great impact on the European system 
of participatory rights. 
So far, the status quo of legal instruments at the EC level is not encouraging. 
But an opportunity remains . Despite its pitfalls the proposed Directive is still an 
improvement of enforcement of environmental law in terms of enhancing 
environmental democracy . It remains to be seen whether and in what shape this 
proposed Directive will find its way through the European organs. Overall, it can be 
said that an enhancement of environmental democracy is on it way on the 
European level. If a legal standing for GOs will be implemented by every 
Member State the future need for such an action before the ECJ could not be longer 
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denied. The Community has the obligation to implement the Aarhus Convention. 
My conclusion here is that there is still a long road ahead, but there will be a 
Directive in the end. 
The EC will be a good example for the international level. Despite the fact 
that NGOs do not have a legal standing before international fora and still lack 
formal recognition as a subject of international law, the increase in participation at 
recent international conventions is a sign that the international community 
recognises NGOs more and more. Undoubtedly, it will take some time to convince 
the international community, but we should have the vast and prom1 mg 
development of international environmental law in recent years in mind. 
With enhancing environmental democracy before international fora we will 
improve enforcement of international environmental. If the right steps are taken, 
we might have a chance to prove Anton Chechov wrong: " .... and with every 
passing day the earth becomes uglier and poorer! ... ?" 
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